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CAUSATION AND THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS
DOCTRINE:
WHY THE CITY OF TIGARD'S EXACTION
WAS A TAKING
JAN G. LArros*
In Dolan v. City of Tigard,' the Supreme Court concluded that it was an
uncompensated and therefore unconstitutional taking for the city of Tigard to
require a landowner, Ms. Dolan, to dedicate a portion of her property in a
floodplain as a public greenway as a condition for a building permit allowing
expansion of her commercial property.2 The city required that Ms. Dolan
waive her Fifth Amendment constitutional guarantee of just compensation for
the private property dedicated to the city. This waiver had to occur for Ms.
Dolan to obtain a benefit (the building permit) that the city had no obligation
to provide her.
This requirement, said the Dolan majority, implicated the doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions. According to the Court, it is "well-settled" under
the doctrine that "the government may not require a person to give up a con-
stitutional right-here the right to receive just compensation when property is
taken for a public use-in exchange for a discretionary benefit conferred by
the government."3
The Court is twice wrong. First, the Dolan case does not ground its analy-
sis in the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. Its central focus is whether the
exactions demanded by the city's permit conditions bear a required relation-
ship to the projected impact of Ms. Dolan's proposed new commercial devel-
opment.4 This inquiry involves causation: does the exaction relate to the harm
"caused" by the new development? Causation is a critical element inherent in
the Takings Clause;5 however, it does not necessarily entail application of the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine.
Second, the Court is wrong when it categorizes the unconstitutional condi-
tions doctrine as being "well-settled." It is a doctrine that has been inconsis-
tently applied over time, varying with the nature of the right the government
* John A. Carver, Jr. Professor of Law, University of Denver College of Law. B.A., Yale
University, 1968; J.D., University of Colorado, 1971; SJ.D., University of Wisconsin Law School,
1975.
1. 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994).
2. Another condition imposed by the city was that she dedicate a portion of her property
adjacent to the floodplain as a bicycle/pedestrian pathway. This article will not consider this sec-
ond condition, although the underlying analysis is the same for both.
3. Dolan, 114 S. CL at 2317.
4. Id. at 2318.
5. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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wants the private party to waive.6 Dolan is grossly misleading when it flatly
states that "the government may not require a person to give up a constitu-
tional right... in exchange for a discretionary benefit conferred by the gov-
ernment."7 Only in certain cases, where particular constitutional rights are at
stake, does the Court's statement ring true.
Professor Thomas Merrill's article addresses these two difficulties with
the Dolan case and the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. He concurs that
the doctrine, as currently understood, is so unclear and muddled that its ex-
planatory power is worthless when used to consider waivers of constitutional
rights in exchange for discretionary governmental benefits.8 Rather than giv-
ing up on the doctrine, however, Merrill sees in Dolan some important scat-
tered clues about its underlying rationale. From these slim pickings he con-
structs a theory of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine that is based on the
assumption that the doctrine has primary applicability in one situation: when
the private exercise of a constitutional right (that would have to be waived in
order to receive the discretionary government benefit) generates positive
externalities benefitting third parties, making it a "public good."
As a public good, the right is valuable to persons outside the govern-
ment/right-holder relationship, while it is simultaneously undervalued by the
right-holder." As a result of this latter consequence, when the right-holder is
considering whether to waive the right, the right-holder will fail to take into
account the positive externalities produced by the exercise of the right." Un-
der Merrill's theory, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine is a direct re-
sponse to this tendency of private parties. By making the condition-the waiv-
er of the right-unconstitutional, courts protect the "public goods" component
of the exercise of the right.
Merrill's argument is a major contribution to a theoretical understanding
of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. He makes an impressive case that
the presence or absence of external benefits associated with the exercise of a
constitutional right will explain why courts have vigorously enforced the doc-
trine in some situations, while ignoring it in others. Merrill convincingly dem-
onstrates that property rights protected by the Fifth Amendment are a category
of rights for which the unconstitutional conditions doctrine is particularly
relevant. When the exercise of property rights is at stake, Merrill shows that
there are external benefits associated with the non-waiver of the right to just
6. See Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2327 n.12 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Kathleen M.
Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REv. 1413, 1416 (1989); Cass R. Sunstein,
Why the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine Is an Anachronism (with Particular Reference to
Religion, Speech, and Abortion), 70 B.U. L. REv. 593, 620 (1990). As Professor Thomas Merrill
points out, there is a "fairly robust version of the doctrine in connection with First Amendment
rights and certain separation of powers controversies; a much weaker version prevails with respect
to reproductive rights and criminal procedural rights." Thomas W. Merrill, Dolan v. City of
Tigard: Constitutional Rights as Public Goods, 72 DENY. U. L. REv. 859, 860-61 (1995).
7. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2317.
8. Merrill, supra note 6, at 859.
9. Id. at 862, 870.
10. Id. at 870, 875.
11. Id. at 871.
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compensation when property is threatened with a "taking" by the government.
Since the Takings Clause, and its just compensation requirement, supply a
pubic good in situations where government is pressuring property owners,
Merrill argues that the Court was correct in Dolan. When it prohibited Ms.
Dolan from having to waive the right to compensation in order to receive her
building permit from the city of Tigard, the Court was protecting a valuable
public good.
This article considers Professor Merrill's "public goods" model as an
explanation for the Court's Fifth Amendment defense of private property
rights in the Dolan case. Part I first summarizes Merrill's thesis. Part I then
suggests that the notion of public goods does far more than provide a coherent
rationale for many unconstitutional conditions cases where property is not
involved. When the police power is exercised to affect property uses, the
public goods idea is an explanation for why private property should be rela-
tively free of regulation, more so than simply a justification for why just com-
pensation should be paid when regulations take property. In other words, in a
private property case, the public goods model is better suited to explaining
why there should be more vigorous constitutional protection of the private
exercise of property rights before just compensation is required, when the
property owner is facing the prospect of excessive government regulation.
Part I further suggests that the real positive externality brought about by
the Takings Clause is not primarily the external benefit produced by the just
compensation requirement. According to Merrill, this is the benefit that flows
from making government pay for property it takes, as opposed to simply per-
mitting government to acquire property without any payment. 2 Part I argues
that the main public good that emerges from the Takings Clause is the positive
market consequence that results when government is deterred by the Takings
Clause, and private parties use and develop property free from unreasonable
government interference.
Part II offers an explanation for the Court's decision in Dolan that is
different from Merrill's read on the case. If the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine is implicated at all in Dolan, it is not Merrill's public goods model
that the Court uses, but rather it is the government "coercion" theory that
undergirds the majority opinion. This theory holds that a private party
agreement with the government to waive constitutional rights should not be
acceptable when there is no legitimate consent by the private party.'3 To the
extent the doctrine has applicability in Dolan, it is Ms. Dolan's inability to
give voluntary consent to the waiver of the Fifth Amendment right that is
most troublesome to the Court, and not some protection of public goods inher-
ent in just compensation.
But the Dolan case is not, in fact, an unconstitutional conditions case. It is
a takings case. And as a takings case, its importance lies in the Court's explic-
it adoption of an element of takings analysis first articulated by Justice Scalia
12. See id. at 882-83.
13. Sullivan, supra note 6, at 1450-56.
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in his dissent in Pennell v. City of San Jose: 14 causation. Justice Scalia ar-
gued that there may be a taking if a land use restriction imposes a public
burden on a private party who did not cause the burden. 5 This is what the
city of Tigard tried to do with Ms. Dolan when it demanded that she give
property to the city in exchange for a building permit, even though there was
no evidence that her expanded use of her property under the building permit
would cause the degree of harm necessitating the dedication. It is the absence
of the necessary causative connection between dedication requirements and her
proposed use of her property that explains why the Supreme Court concluded
the city had violated the Takings Clause.
The city of Tigard did not necessarily violate the unconstitutional condi-
tions doctrine. Its error was to act inconsistently with the central purpose of
the Takings Clause. As one Supreme Court case declared, the Takings Clause
is intended "to bar the government [the city of Tigard] from forcing some peo-
ple alone [Ms. Dolan] to bear public burdens [the dedication] which, in all
fairness and justice, should be borne by the public [the taxpayers of Tigard] as
a whole."'"
I. PUBLIC GOODS AND POsITIVE EXTERNALITEs INHERENT IN BOTH THE
RIGHT TO JUST COMPENSATION AND THE PRIVATE EXERCISE OF PROPERTY
RIGHTS
A. Unconstitutional Conditions and the Merrill Public Goods Model
One of the great difficulties with the unconstitutional conditions doctrine
is that it is inconsistent with one basic tenet of a free market society: Individu-
als should be able to enter into arrangements with others where they trade
their rights, to receive in return, some valuable benefit. The unconstitutional
conditions doctrine prevents this exchange by invalidating some transactions
involving the relinquishment of constitutional rights in exchange for a discre-
tionary governmental benefit. For example, in the case of Ms. Dolan, she had
to give up her right of just compensation for dedicating land to the city in
exchange for a building permit. Professor Merrill takes issue with the two
most commonly cited grounds for not enforcing such agreements, which in
turn have become rationales for explaining the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine.
First, it has been argued that agreements which call for an individual to
waive a constitutional right should not stand because the individual waiver
must somehow have been coerced, thereby making the consent involuntary. 7
Merrill believes this rationale is problematic because when an individual
waives a constitutional right, it is because that individual believes the
government's discretionary benefit obtained in exchange for the waiver will be
14. 485 U.S. 1 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
15. Pennell, 485 U.S. at 20-22.
16. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
17. See generally RIcHARD A. EPsTEIN, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE (1993); see also
Sullivan, supra note 6, at 1428-50.
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more valuable than the right that is given up.' Otherwise, the individual
would never release the right. This is not coercion; this is precisely why indi-
viduals enter into contracts, which is to be better off after the exchange than
before.
Second, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine also has been justified as
a response to the unequal bargaining power held by the government when it
alone is able to supply the benefit sought by the private individual. If govern-
ment is the only supplier of a particular benefit, then its monopoly position
prevents individuals from seeking alternative offers in a normally competitive
market. As a result, the government is in a position to dictate the terms for
acquiring the benefit, which may include requiring the individual to give up a
right otherwise available under the Constitution. 9
Merrill, however, does not believe this "government monopoly" theory is
a satisfactory explanation. This is in part because (1) the government does not
always wield monopoly power with respect to the benefit sought (e.g., in the
employment market), 0 and (2) gross disparity in bargaining power, even be-
tween the government and a private party, should not necessarily justify inval-
idating waivers of constitutional rights procured in exchange for the granting
of a nondiscretionary benefit.
2'
Professor Merrill's alternative explanation for the unconstitutional condi-
tions doctrine is based on the assumption that some constitutional rights are,
when exercised by private parties, public goodsY.2  A public good is an
economist's term for the consequence that follows when a private party's
action benefits not only the private party, but also third parties. Merrill theo-
rizes that some constitutional rights are like public goods because the exercise
of that right by private parties advantages the right-holder and generates posi-
tive externalities that benefit parties who are not directly involved with a
party's exercise of the right. For example, the First Amendment right of free
speech may be considered a public good, since its exercise by even one person
will eventually supply information to other persons, who will benefit there-
by.
23
When a constitutional right is a public good, any external benefits associ-
ated with the exercise of the right will tend to be overlooked by the individual
right-holder. The individual owning the right will not be interested in the
public benefits that are incidentally supplied if the right is exercised. Such
external benefits are usually irrelevant to the right-holder, who will ofily be
concerned about whether the exercise of the right will be of benefit to that
18. See Merrill, supra note 6, at 859-60.
19. See Richard A. Epstein, Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of
Consent, 102 HARv. L. REv. 1, 8 (1988).
20. Merrill, supra note 6, at 860.
21. Id. at 869-70 n.59; see also United States v. Mezzanatto, 115 S. Ct. 797, 805-06 (1995)
("gross disparity" in bargaining power between government and individual does not justify invali-
dating waivers procured as part of plea bargaining process).
22. Merrill, supra note 6, at 870-72.
23. Daniel A. Farber, Free Speech Without Romance: Public Choice and the First Amend-
ment, 105 HARv. L. REV. 554, 558-60 (1991).
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right-holder. As a result, if the right-holder believes that the costs of waiving a
constitutional right are outweighed by the advantages of receiving a
nondiscretionary governmental benefit in return, the right-holder will waive the
right, even if the public is made worse off by the non-exercise of the right.
Professor Merrill argues that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine is a
direct response to this tendency on the part of private parties to undervalue the
exercise of some constitutional rights. The doctrine prevents the individual
waiver of the right, even when the right-holder is better off, if the waiver
could result in a suboptimal supply of the external, third-party benefits that
would follow if the right were exercised.24
Professor Merrill goes on to make a persuasive case that the public goods
theory helps to explain why courts vigorously apply the unconstitutional condi-
tions doctrine with respect to some rights, but not to others. The reason for
this varying application is due to a judicial perception that the level of public
benefits differs from right to right. When a right has an obvious public goods
dimension (e.g., the right to free speech), the doctrine will be enforced and
waivers of the right voided. When the right is thought to provide fewer public
benefits (e.g., the right to trial by jury), the doctrine will be less vigorously
enforced, regardless of how highly valued the right is to the individual.'
When Merrill's theory is applied to the Dolan case, the question is wheth-
er the Fifth Amendment right to just compensation for takings of private prop-
erty has a public goods component. This would be so if unrestricted private
party waivers of the right, in return for a discretionary government benefit
(e.g., a building permit), could result in a suboptimal supply of some public
benefit. Concern about this negative consequence would then explain the
Dolan result, which found the city of Tigard's condition (Ms. Dolan's dedica-
tion of land without just compensation) to be unconstitutional. The task for
Professor Merrill is identifying the public benefit realized by the just compen-
sation requirement.
He rejects as unsuitable to his public goods model an array of theories
that take into account third-party effects. Among the arguments he discards
are: (1) the idea that government action should not disproportionately burden
some individuals with no compensation;26 (2) the fear that demoralization
costs will be incurred when private parties witness other private parties who
are not offered compensation for the taking of their property;" and (3) the
need to prevent uncompensated takings that, in effect, change the preexisting
pattern of wealth distribution and give rise to rent seeking behavior.28
24. See Merrill, supra note 6, at 871. Professor Merrill acknowledges that while other com-
mentators have recognized the public goods argument, they have not accepted it as a general
theory of unconstitutional conditions. Id. at 871-72 n.70.
25. Id. at 874-75.
26. See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
27. See Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foun-
dations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARv. L. REV. 1165, 1214 (1967).
28. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN 306-24 (1985); Thomas W. Merrill, Rent Seeking and the Compensation Principle, 80
Nw. U. L. REV. 1561 (1986).
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There is, however, a third-party effect that he does accept as a justifica-
tion for applying the unconstitutional conditions doctrine to the Takings
Clause-the argument from "fiscal illusion." 9 This argument assumes that if
government seizes property without paying, it will overuse its taking power
and acquire more property than it needs (or is economically efficient to have
under government control). This will lead to the fiscal illusion that the govern-
ment is saving taxpayer dollars that it otherwise would have to spend to com-
pensate private property owners, when, in fact, the government will have
acquired excessively large stockpiles of property, which could have been de-
ployed in a more efficient way if the property had remained in private hands.
The public good that comes from the right of just compensation is the more
efficient allocation of resources and property that will occur if government has
to pay for private property, which will tend to keep property in private hands
until it is worth the market price to government officials. Conversely, if pri-
vate property is acquired through waiver of the right to compensation, this
property will become susceptible to misallocation by the new government
owners.
Professor Merrill posits that application of the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine simultaneously helps ensure that resources are put to the best uses
through normal market forces and prevents the threat of possible government
misallocation of resources." The doctrine accomplishes these dual goods by
imposing limits on when waivers of the just compensation right will be ac-
ceptable. Merrill sees the Dolan case as establishing one such limit-after
Dolan, government exactions demanding waivers of the right to just compen-
sation must bear a required relationship, or nexus, to the projected impact of
the property use that will be permitted after the property owner receives the
government benefit."1
B. Public Goods and the Exercise of Private Property Rights
Professor Merrill's public goods model certainly advances our understand-
ing of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. His model serves as a more
satisfactory explanation of how and why the doctrine has been used by courts
than many of the competing theories that have been advanced by commen-
tators.32 However, a public goods rationale for when the Takings Clause is
applicable to property development exactions may simultaneously explain not
enough and too much.
This section of Part I considers why his argument does not go far enough.
The thesis advanced below is that Merrill's public goods theory should be
29. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 51 (3d ed. 1986); Lawrence
Blume & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Compensation for Takings: An Economic Analysis, 72 CAL. L.
REV. 569, 620-22 (1984).
30. Merrill, supra note 6, at 883.
31. Id.
32. See, for example, the theories described in Larry Alexander, Understanding Constitution-
al Rights in a World of Optional Baselines, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 175 (1989); Lynn A. Baker,
The Price of Rights: Toward a Positive Theory of Unconstitutional Conditions, 75 CORNELL L.
REV. 1185 (1990); Epstein, supra note 19; Sullivan, supra note 6.
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extended beyond the unconstitutional conditions doctrine to act as a check on
all police power exercises, even those not utilizing exactions, that interfere
with the development of private property rights. Part II considers how his
theory goes too far, particularly with respect to the Dolan case. Dolan is best
understood not as an unconstitutional conditions case employing a public
goods theory, but as a takings case, the significance of which lies in its explic-
it adoption of causation as a critical factor when exactions are imposed in
private uses of property.
1. Positive Externalities Associated with Private Property Use
Professor Merrill correctly points out that when a private action becomes
a public good, four consequences follow.3 While he discusses these effects
in the context of the constitutional right to just compensation, the same effects
are present before just compensation is awarded, when private parties use and
develop property largely free from government interference.
The first characteristic of a public good is that a private party's behavior
will have a positive effect on third parties. In the case of property owned by a
private party, sales or transfers of that property to others may not only benefi-
cially affect the seller and the purchaser, but may also positively impact on
others. For example, the new owner might use the property in such a way that
permits consumers to enjoy a necessary commodity (e.g., an oil and gas lessee
in a lease relationship with the lessor-owner develops an energy resource that
is available to third parties to heat homes or drive cars). Even when there is
no conveyance, the development of property by an owner has repercussions
beyond the owner when the use makes the property productive, not static. For
example, water in a river owned by a party who never uses the water may be
far less valuable than water in a river diverted by the owner in order to trans-
form a desert into a city.
Second, the democratic political process will tend to overregulate private
property uses. Overregulation of private property may occur for two reasons.
The political process wishes to curb any social costs or negative externalities
associated with the property use. For example, if wildlife is valued by a soci-
ety, uses of property that adversely affect wildlife will be perceived as a cost,
and these uses of property may be restricted. If such regulation becomes over-
ly zealous, however, it becomes difficult to organize those who benefit from
the adverse use to fight the regulations. This is because those beneficiaries will
assume that the property owner will do battle with the government, and they
will be able to prevail on the owner's effort, rather than mounting their own
attack.
Third, if property use does create a public good and the property owner
contemplates a challenge to the overregulation of the property, that owner will
ignore any external benefits associated with the use of the property. This is
because property owners are generally individuals who seek to maximize their
own interest. If an owner's use of property will have private value, it is only
33. Merrill, supra note 6, at 870-72.
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that private value that will be weighed against the costs of resisting regulations
of property. It will be irrelevant to the decision that there may be other, more
public values present if the property is freed from regulatory restrictions.
Fourth, property owners adversely affected by regulation may choose not
to resist regulatory restrictions in court. This will occur quite often whenever
the cost of such a challenge exceeds the benefits of using the property freely.
Such benefits will not include the public goods component of the property use
because such external benefits will be ignored by property owners concerned
only with their own interests. The cumulative effect of individual decisions by
property owners not to resist overregulation will be a suboptimal supply of the
external benefits associated with the exercise of property rights.
The law has not been insensitive to these four realities of private property.
One legal response, which Professor Merrill correctly cites, is the common law
rule against restraints on alienation.34 This rule is intended to prevent third
parties from being deprived of the external benefits that flow from allowing
property to be transferred to its highest and best use.3" The constitutional law
response was the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Although its text
suggests that the Takings Clause was designed to ensure that government paid
owners for private property it took, its more important role is to threaten the
just compensation sanction, and thereby discourage unnecessary regulation of
private uses of property.
The regulatory takings doctrine can thus be seen as preserving the external
benefits for third parties that result from reducing regulation of private proper-
ty. When regulatory excesses are deterred by the credible threat of a vigorous-
ly enforced Takings Clause, the public benefits of private uses of property are
maximized. When regulation of property is unchecked, which occurs if Tak-
ings Clause challenges do not succeed, and excessive use of the police power
is thereby not deterred, the result is a suboptimal supply of a public good-the
third party benefits associated with property made productive by private enter-
prise.
2. The Role of the Takings Clause in Protecting the Public Goods
Component of the Property Use
When the relevant public good is the private exercise of property rights,
and not, as Professor Merrill suggests, the governmental payment of just com-
pensation to private parties after their property has been taken, then the three
justifications for the Takings Clause discounted under Merrill's public goods
model appear more persuasive.'
The first of these justifications, cited prominently in the Dolan opinion,
prevents the government from disproportionately burdening one party or a
very small number of individuals, when others are not subject to equivalent
34. Id. at 872.
35. Many 19th Century statutes similarly sought to protect private property rights from regu-
lations that did not serve the goal of economic growth. See JAMES W. HURST, LAW AND THE
CONDmoNs OF FREEDOM: IN THE NINEEENTH-CENTURY Ut=rTE STATES 7 (1956).
36. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
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burdens.37 This rationale assumes that when the action of one party (e.g., the
owner of private property) generates positive benefits enjoyed by third parties
(e.g., those who benefit from the productive use of property), it is wrong, if
not stupid, to saddle the generator of the public good with a regulatory burden.
It is preferable instead to share the cost of the regulation with others (includ-
ing those who benefit from the public good). Under this rationale, Ms. Dolan
should not have to bear the entire burden of providing, free of charge, a public
greenway to recreational visitors trampling along the city of Tigard's flood-
plain.
A second justification for the Takings Clause is that it reduces what Pro-
fessor Frank Michelman calls the "demoralization costs" which arise from the
realization that no compensation is offered for a taking.38 Michelman is com-
menting on the effect that excessive regulation of property has on other prop-
erty owners who witness, but not directly experience, the regulatory impact.
When property owner A (Ms. Dolan's neighbor) sees that property owner B
(Ms. Dolan) cannot develop B's property because of regulatory hurdles (an
exaction requirement), A may be less inclined to develop A's property (A will
be "demoralized"). This means that third parties will be denied the public
goods component not just of B's property, but also of A's.
A third justification for the Takings Clause is to prevent the government
from changing the preexisting distribution of wealth.39 Governmental action
can bring about this result if it forces or authorizes exchanges of property
between property owners without compensating the losers for their loss. For
example, if a county authorizes a surface owner to build a subdivision above a
subsurface owner's underground coal estate, thereby preventing the subsurface
owner from removing the coal, the county will have taken from the subsurface
owner and given to the surface owner. Since the subsurface owner's use of the
coal would have benefitted third parties (e.g., consumers of electricity, where
the electricity is generated at coal-fired power plants), government action that
causes the coal to remain in the ground will have caused an undersupply of a
public good. The Takings Clause is intended both to discourage such govern-
ment-caused exchanges and, if the exchange does occur, to compensate those
whose property has been sacrificed in order to benefit others.
The public goods model thus works well to describe how and why the
Takings Clause operates to encourage productive uses of private property-for
example, by discouraging the government from employing its police powers to
overregulate such uses. The public good at stake is the positive externality
associated with private land and property use. However, it is not, as Professor
Merrill suggests, the public benefit that follows from preventing the govern-
ment from acquiring (without compensation) an inefficiently large quantity of
private property.
37. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2316 (1994).
38. See Michelman, supra note 27, at 1214.
39. See EPSTEIN, supra note 28.
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II. UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS AND CAUSATION IN THE DOLAN CASE
If Professor Merrill's public goods model is a persuasive explanation for
why private property uses should be constitutionally protected from overregu-
lation, does his model also explain why the Court decided that the city of
Tigard's exactions were a taking? The initial section of Part H argues that, to
the extent the Dolan case involved the unconstitutional conditions doctrine at
all, it was the individual coercion/government monopoly theory that caused the
Court to activate the doctrine and not Merrill's public goods theory. The sec-
ond section of Part II suggests that the Dolan case is not an unconstitutional
conditions case at all, but rather a case addressing the causation component of
the Takings Clause.
A. Unconstitutional Conditions and the Dolan Case
Professor Merrill's public goods model is based on the premise that the
two most commonly used justifications for the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine are unsound. These are, first, the coercion theory (i.e., waivers of
constitutional rights should not be enforced because the waiver was co-
erced),' and second, the government monopoly theory (i.e., since the govern-
ment is the sole supplier of the discretionary benefit sought, and since the
private party cannot proceed with its plans without this benefit, the private
party's waiver is not voluntary)."
Both of these theories assume that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine
is appropriate when the waiver of the constitutional right is not consensual.
Contrary to what Merrill assumes, however, coercion, government monopoly,
and lack of genuine consent serve as important justifications for the takings
holding in Dolan. They also underlie the earlier Supreme Court case involving
exactions-Nollan v. California Coastal Commission.42 That the unconstitu-
tional conditions doctrine has any relevance at all to these cases is due to the
Court's belief that in both Nollan and Dolan there was no true consent due to
defects in the private party/government bargaining process.
In Nollan, the Court considered whether a permit condition exacted by a
government agency was a taking. The Court implicitly relied on the unconsti-
tutional conditions doctrine when it found that a land dedication exaction was
unconstitutional because the private party would have had to give up the right
to just compensation in order to receive the permit."3 The unconstitutional
conditions doctrine was enforced in Nollan when the Court realized that the
condition, which the Court characterized as "the yielding of a property inter-
est" by the private party, "cannot be regarded as [a] voluntary 'exchange."'"
Since the permit-for-a-right exchange was involuntary, and since the govern-
ment had a monopoly on the supply of permits, there was no real consent to
40. See Merrill, supra note 6, at 859-60, 869-70.
41. Id.
42. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
43. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 831, 842.
44. Id. at 834 n.2.
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the waiver of the right. The Court later underscored the coercion element
when it called the exaction condition "not a valid regulation of land use but
'an out-and-out plan of extortion. '
Similarly, in Dolan, the Court viewed the conditions imposed on Ms.
Dolan as "not simply a limitation on the use [of the property], but a require-
ment that she deed portions of the property to the city." The city is not
merely negotiating with her as part of a voluntary exchange of her rights for a
government permit; the city's offer is seen as "exactions demanded by [its]
permit conditions."'47 That Ms. Dolan is being coerced is also suggested by
the Court's choice of language when it describes the position she is put in by
the city: "[T]he city has forced her to chose between the building permit and
her right under the Fifth Amendment. . . ."' If she waives this constitutional
right, her "right to exclude would not be regulated, it would be eviscerat-
ed.' 
49
Such statements in Nollan and Dolan demonstrate that in these important
property rights cases, the Court is not interested in Professor Merrill's public
goods model. Rather, it is concerned with the degree of leverage and power
the relevant government actor has over the private property owner. This power
becomes coercive because (1) only the government can supply the permit that
is necessary for the intended private property use, and (2) the private party is
faced with a choice of evils--either the constitutional right is relinquished or
the property cannot be developed as planned. It is this aspect of the exactions
in Nollan and Dolan that was most troublesome to the Court, because it meant
that any waiver could not be truly consensual.
B. Causation: Why the City of Tigard's Exaction Was a Taking
Although the Dolan Court (and to a certain extent the Nollan Court) is
concerned with the coercive dimensions of the government's actions, the ulti-
mate takings holding is not based on the fact that the condition, Ms. Dolan's
waiver, was coerced by the government. Nor does the Court in Dolan attempt
to ground its analysis in the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. There is only
one sentence in the opinion that even mentions the doctrine."0 The case fo-
cuses on the Takings Clause and whether the city's exaction has caused a
taking of Ms. Dolan's property. What makes Dolan an important decision is
not that it advances our understanding of the unconstitutional conditions doc-
trine, but that it contributes enormously to our understanding of how the Tak-
ings Clause operates.
The central argument in the Dolan case was that the city had not identi-
fied any special burdens that would be caused by Ms. Dolan's expansion of
her commercial property, and that would therefore justify the particular dedica-
45. Id. at 837.
46. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2316 (emphasis added).
47. Id. at 2318 (emphasis added).
48. Id. at 2317.
49. Id. at 2321.
50. Id. at 2317.
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tions required from her but not the general public.5 The Dolan Court agreed,
and engrafted on the Takings Clause a requirement that there be a reasonable
and sufficient relation between the government condition and the harm the
development would cause. The Dolan rule, which should now be a component
of takings analysis (but not necessarily the unconstitutional conditions doc-
trine) is simply this: "The city [the government actor] must make some sort of
individualized determination that the required dedication [the condition] is
related both in nature and extent to the impact [caused by] the proposed [pri-
vate party] development."52
The essence of this Dolan rule is that there must be a "cause and effect"
relationship between the social evil that the exaction or regulation seeks to
remedy and the property use that is either (1) subject to an exaction require-
ment, or (2) restricted by a regulation. If this causative link is absent, as it was
in Dolan, the government action may be an unconstitutional taking.
There is a good reason for adding a causation requirement to the Takings
Clause. In one frequently cited case, Armstrong v. United States,53 the Court
opined that the primary purpose of the Takings Clause is "to bar Government
from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness
and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole." 4 This principle pre-
vents the government from disproportionately burdening or picking on one
person or a small number of individuals when other persons similarly situated
are not subject to similar burdens. This principle has been repeated in several
recent Supreme Court takings cases, including Dolan. Indeed, so often is it
recited by the Court that Professor Merrill correctly notes it has "taken on the
quality of a canonical recitation.""
The Armstrong anti-discrimination principle helps courts determine if a
government action (either a condition or a restriction) is a taking. On the one
hand, if an owner's use of property is the cause of a social problem, then
government action conditioning or restricting that owner's use of the property
will be linked to eradicating the problem, and it cannot be said that the proper-
ty owner has been unfairly singled out. In such a situation, apart from a denial
of all economic use," or a physical occupation,57 there is no certain protec-
tion afforded by the Takings Clause. But if the condition or restriction is im-
posed on a property owner who has not caused the problem that the govern-
ment action is designed to correct, then the owner is being singled out and the
Takings Clause might be violated.
51. Id. The other half of Ms. Dolan's argument was that the city had not identified special
benefits conferred on her that would justify the exaction.
52. Id. at 2319-20.
53. 364 U.S. 40 (1960).
54. Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 49. The Armstrong rationale is intended to skewer the assump-
tion (sometimes known as the Robin Hood approach) that property owners can be made to bear
disproportionate costs because of their wealth. See James L. Huffman, Dolan v. City of Tigard:
Another Step in the Right Direction, 25 ENVrL. L. 143, 152 (1995).
55. See Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2316; Merrill, supra note 6, at 880 n.lO0.
56. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Comm'n, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
57. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 448 U.S. 419 (1982).
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The Dolan case is an example of how the Takings Clause becomes impli-
cated when there is no demonstrable causative connection between a govern-
ment action that has taken the form of a condition and the harm produced by
the use of private property. The harm that would be caused by the proposed
expansion of Ms. Dolan's commercial property was the resulting increase in
the amount of impervious surface, that in turn would increase the quantity and
rate of storm water flow from her property onto a floodplain. Given this harm,
the Court said that the city could require her to not build in the floodplain,
because if she had, it might have enhanced the prospects of flooding in the
city.
But the city demanded more: "[I]t not only wanted petitioner not to build
in the floodplain, but it also wanted petitioner's property along [a river] for its
greenway system."58 The Court reasoned that, while Ms. Dolan's proposed
expansion would cause more water to run off her property than before, it
would not cause a need for the city to acquire her property, free of charge,
along the river. If she kept her property in the floodplain in a natural state
(which she intended to do), then the city's legitimate interest in reducing
flooding would be accomplished. But, if she had to dedicate this property to
the city, the city would have gained ownership of a free recreational pathway
for its greenway system. She was being "singled out" to bear the burden of
providing private land for a public floodplain easement when she had not
caused the city's need for acquisition of the easement. This was a taking.
This causation rationale behind a takings holding had been previously
offered by Justice Scalia in his dissenting opinion Pennell v. City of San
Jose.59 The Pennell case involved a police power restriction on property, not
a condition. A city rent control ordinance permitted officials to deny landlords
otherwise reasonable rent increases when the increase would pose an economic
hardship to certain poor tenants. The majority opinion dismissed the landlords'
takings challenge as premature. Justice Scalia did not believe the claim to be
premature and addressed the merits.
He argued that the hardship provisions had worked a taking because there
was no "cause and effect" relationship between the property use subject to the
regulation (rent control imposed on landlords who rented their property to
tenants) and the social evil the regulation sought to remedy (renters too poor
to afford even reasonably priced housing).'
According to Justice Scalia, the rent control law was a taking because it
had singled out for a special burden a particular class of property owners,
landlords, who happened to rent to a "hardship" tenant. The tenant's hardship
58. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2320.
59. 485 U.S. 1 (1988).
60. Pennell, 485 U.S. at 21-22 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("But that problem [poor renters] is no
more caused or exploited by landlords than it is by the grocers who sell needy renters their food,
or the department stores that sell them their clothes...."); see also Douglas W. Kmiec, The Orig-
inal Understanding of the Taking Clause Is Neither Weak Nor Obtuse, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1630,
1653 (1988) ("In a variation of the harm ... inquiry familiar to land-use practitioners confronting
subdivision exactions, Justice Scalia [in Pennell] writes that the taking question must be answered
in relation to whether the singled-out landowner has caused the particular social harm.").
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had not been caused by the landlords. That hardship had been caused by the
tenant, or society at large. The social problem of poor tenants should therefore
be addressed by the public at large through welfare payments or public hous-
ing, but not through a rent control law that denied landlords a reasonable rent
increase.
Similarly, since a need for additional public greenway along the river in
the city of Tigard had not been caused by Ms. Dolan's desire to expand her
commercial property,6' she should not be singled out to bear the burden of
dedicating her land to the city so that it could have additional open space for
its greenway system within the floodplain. If the city wanted the land owned
by Ms. Dolan in the floodplain, it would have to pay her for that land, not
"take" it through an exaction.
The Dolan opinion and Justice Scalia's dissent in Pennell are not the only
examples of courts using causation as a determinative factor in takings cases.
Several state courts, particularly in Washington and Oregon, have relied on a
causation test when considering facts similar to the Dolan case.62 The issue in
these cases (as in Dolan) was whether conditions imposed by government
agencies on property owners in exchange for a government benefit worked an
unconstitutional taking.
These conditions have taken the form of requirements for private dedica-
tions of land, construction of improvements, and the payment of fees. When
these state courts concluded that the proposed property use would not cause
the problem that the condition was meant to remedy, there was a taking.63
Conversely, when the property use would have a negative impact that the
condition would ameliorate, there was no taking.' In both situations, the
presence or absence of causation determined whether there was a taking.65
61. There was no evidence that Ms. Dolan's proposed development had encroached on ex-
isting greenway space. See Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2321. Had that been the case, the city could have
required her to provide some alternative greenway space, because then she would have caused the
reduction in greenway area.
62. See infra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
63. See, e.g., The Luxembourg Group, Inc. v. Snohomish County, 887 P.2d 446, 448 (Wash.
Ct. App. 1995) (a "dedication requirement [that] would not remedy any problem caused by
the ... subdivision ... requiring [the subdivider] to dedicate property ... amounts to an uncon-
stitutional taking"); Castle Homes & Dev. v. Brier City, 882 P.2d 1172, 1178 (Wash. Ct. App.
1994) (holding a fee exaction invalid when the city did not show that the fee would pay for im-
provements necessary "as a direct result of the proposed development").
64. Home Builders Ass'n v. City of Scottsdale, 902 P.2d 1347, 1350 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995)
(no taking when fees are "directly necessitated by the needs created by the new development");
J.C. Reeves Corp. v. Clarksman County, 887 P.2d 360, 365 (Or. Ct. App. 1994) (construction of
improvements); Trimen Dev. Co. v. King County, 877 P.2d 187, 194 (Wash. 1994) (development
fee).
65. The causation issue can also work to deny a property owner just compensation if the
court concludes that any harm suffered by the property owner has not been caused by government
action. See, e.g., Powell v. Powell, 877 F. Supp. 628, 631 (M.D. Ga. 1995) (finding no taking
when government was only an indirect cause of the reduction in the amount of retired pay that an
individual could retain after his divorce); Customer Co. v. City of Sacramento, 895 P.2d 900, 911
(Cal. 1995) (finding no taking when government did not cause an armed felon attempting to avoid
capture to enter a property owner's store); Department of Transp. v. Hewett Profess'l, 895 P.2d
755, 763 (Or. 1995) (finding no taking when a private party, not the government, demolished a
building).
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What is exhibited in Dolan, in Scalia's dissent in Pennell, and in these
state cases is not a manifestation of Professor Merrill's public goods-positive
externalities model for unconstitutional conditions. Rather, these opinions
demand that government exactions, which take the form of conditions for
government benefits, must be designed to internalize only the negative
externalities generated by property owners. When a negative externality is
created, the harmful effects of property use will be borne by members of soci-
ety who are "external" to the producer of the harm. For example, a subdivider
who does not construct for a subdivision a sewage treatment facility may harm
homeowners who live downstream of the subdivision. Such externalities are
internalized by requiring their producer, the property owner, to pay for them.
However, if the exaction does more, and requires the property owner to
correct a general social cost not caused by the owner's anticipated property
use (as was the case with Ms. Dolan and the city of Tigard's problem with
flooding), the exaction works as a taking. It is a taking because the exaction
will then have violated the Armstrong anti-discrimination principle that under-
lies the Takings Clause.'
Thus, Dolan is not an unconstitutional conditions case exemplifying the
public goods model, but a takings case requiring that conditions on property
use internalize only the negative impacts caused by the owner's new use of
the property.
II]. CONCLUSION
Professor Merrill's thesis is a major contribution to the general unconstitu-
tional conditions doctrine. It does not, however, fully explain either the Dolan
decision, or the larger issue of why some exactions imposed on property own-
ers seeking permission to develop property become takings. In these property
rights cases, the proper question is not whether the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine should be enforced, but whether the condition internalizes a negative
externality caused by the property owner's proposed land use. If the problem
addressed by the condition is not a societal cost caused by the new property
use, then the condition is not internalizing an externality produced by the
property owner. Instead, it is forcing the property owner to bear the sole bur-
den of correcting a problem not attributable to the owner. If causation is ab-
sent, then the Armstrong anti-discrimination principle is violated, and the
condition becomes an unconstitutional taking.
On the other hand, if a court finds that the government action was the proximate cause of
the property owner's injury, particularly if the injury is in the nature of a physical invasion, then it
is more likely that a taking exists. See, e.g., State v. Doyle, 735 P.2d 733, 738 (Alaska 1987)
(inverse condemnation when property diminished in value because of state's action); Hoover v.
Pierce County, 903 P.2d 464, 468 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995) (county's actions caused taking when
county construction funneled water onto private property).
66. See supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text.
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